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THE PROVISION OF HEALTHCARE TO YOUNG AND DEPENDENT CHILDREN: THE 
PRINCIPLES, CONCEPTS AND UTILITY OF THE CHILDREN ACT 1989   
 
Abstract 
This article undertakes a thorough analysis of the case law concerned with the provision of 
healthcare to young and dependent children.  It demonstrates how, despite the procedural 
changes introduced by the Children Act 1989 at an early stage in this body of case law, cases 
have continued to be brought to court by way of applications for the court to exercise its 
inherent jurisdiction or in wardship rather than using the orders introduced by the Act. In 
determining these cases, the court is focused upon its protective duty to the vulnerable but 
proceedings appear to be adversarial contests between the claims of adults to know what is 
best for the child in which the medical view normally prevails. Through consideration of the 
principles and concepts of the Children Act of parental responsibility, working together, the 
welfare principle and placing the child at the centre of care, this article demonstrates their 
utility, as yet to be fully realised, in relation to the responsibilities of parents, professionals, 
public authorities and the courts concerned with the provision of healthcare to young and 
dependent children.   
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There had been a small number of cases concerned with the provision of healthcare to 
children1 when the Children Act 1989 (hereafter Children Act) came into force in October 1991.  
Despite the changes introduced by the Act to child law, the approach adopted in those early 
cases to decision-making and the resolution of disputes over children’s healthcare has 
endured. Healthcare professionals are required to secure consent to the medical treatment of 
a child from someone authorised to give consent, holders of parental responsibility, to avoid 
liability in civil and criminal law for battery.2  The courts have maintained the framing of this as 
the parental right to decide.3 Although, consistent with the concept of parental responsibility, 
this is a right asserted against others, in this case the healthcare professionals who also have 
an interest in the treatment provided, rather than the child.  Should healthcare professionals, 
who are also under a duty to act in the best interests of the child, consider that parental 
decisions about a child’s medical treatment are contrary to the child’s interests the matter must 
be referred to court for determination. Despite the provisions for court orders regarding the 
upbringing and welfare of children introduced by the Children Act, the vast majority of cases 
are referred to court in applications for the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction.  Rather 
than consider the principles of parental responsibility or apply the welfare principle and 
checklist, these cases are decided by the court fulfilling its protective duty to the child through 
an independent assessment of the child’s best interests. Disagreements are thus framed as 
disputes which must be resolved in court; the parental right to decide replaced by judicial 
decree.  Judgments provide guidance as to how a court may approach a dispute between 
those with parental responsibility and healthcare professionals about a child’s medical 
treatment but not upon the legal duties of those primarily responsible for the provision of 
treatment and care.  
                                                 
The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for the Medical Law Review for their 
careful, considered and challenging comments on an earlier draft. 
1  Considered below in text at n.11-22. 
2  In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147, 178. 
3  Ibid., 193. 
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Questions about a child’s medical treatment were clearly envisaged as falling within the scope 
of the provisions of the Children Act, which was described in the Commons by the then Leader 
of the House, Sir Geoffrey Howe, as ‘a comprehensive and integrated statutory framework to 
ensure the welfare of children’.4  Much was written in anticipation of the Children Act coming 
into force.5  This literature recognised that children’s medical treatment came within its scope 
without directly addressing how its principles and concepts applied to the specific issues raised 
by the provision of healthcare to children. For example, writing in 1991, in the Archives of 
Disease in Childhood, Stephen Cretney sought to explain the full implications of the legislation 
for paediatricians but only in relation to their court-related work.6 More recently, with specific 
reference to the concept of parental responsibility, McFarlane LJ observed that many had not, 
at least until recently, ‘grasp[ed] the importance and the utility of the concept’.7 I argue that 
this is the case for the application of the principles and concepts of the Children Act more 
generally as they apply to the provision of healthcare to children.  
 
The Children Act sought to create a ‘single statutory framework which would reflect a coherent 
set of legal concepts and principles’,8 bringing together public and private law relating to 
children to create a comprehensive set of rules for child law. It provides for private law orders 
to settle disputes between parents over the upbringing of children, services to help parents 
with children in need and compulsory powers for intervention where parental care places the 
child at least at risk of significant harm.  Andrew Bainham has reflected upon hybrid cases 
                                                 
4  Hansard, HC Debate, vol. 158, col. 1075 (26 October 1989).  
5  The non-exhaustive list includes John Eekelaar & Robert Dingwall, The Reform of Child Care 
Law: A Practical Guide to the Children Act 1989, 1990; Michael Freeman, Children, Their 
Families and the Law, 1992; Nick Allen, Making Sense of the Children Act, 1990; White, Carr 
and Lowe, The Children Act in Practice, 1989; Andrew Bainham, Children – the new law: the 
Children Act 1989, 1990; A. Jane Bridge, Stuart Bridge, Susan Luke, Blackstone’s Guide to the 
Children Act 1989, 1990. 
6  Stephen Cretney, ‘Implications of the Children Act 1989 for paediatric practice’ (1991) 66 
Archives of Disease in Childhood 536-541. 
7  The Right Honourable Lord Justice McFarlane, ‘Making Parental Responsibility Work’ [2014] 
Fam Law 1264-1276, 1270. 
8  Brenda Hoggett, Parents and Children: The Law of Parental Responsibility, 1993, 9. 
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under the Children Act provisions, public law cases with private law dimensions and vice versa 
and cases which transform from public to private or the reverse.9 The private/public dimension 
of cases concerning children’s healthcare is of a different nature.  There are examples of the 
courts resolving private disagreements between holders of parental responsibility on elective 
matters such as children’s immunisation or ritual male circumcision where different beliefs 
negotiated prior to parental separation become a battleground between warring parents.10  
The majority of cases, however, involve a challenge to the decision of parents by the 
healthcare Trust or local authority on behalf of health professionals who are unable, in all 
professional conscience, to accept the parental decision about the provision of medical 
treatment in the best interests of a young and dependent child.  Disagreements about 
children’s healthcare therefore straddle private and public domains; the exercise of parental 
responsibility challenged by professionals, who have legal duties to the child, in the public 
setting of an NHS hospital where questions arise about public duties to protect the welfare of 
children.  
 
This article first critically examines the case law concerned with the provision of medical 
treatment to young and dependent children. The additional issues raised by the healthcare 
decisions of older children, and cases in which the court is asked to determine the legality of 
withdrawing or withholding treatment from a child with a life-limiting condition, are beyond the 
scope of this article; those cases raise further personal, relational, professional, caring, social, 
ethical and legal issues which require separate consideration. However, where the legal 
principles established in that wider body of case law are equally applicable they are considered 
here.  Consideration of the case law demonstrates that, despite the procedural changes 
introduced by the Children Act 1989, the majority of cases are still brought to court by way of 
applications for the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction or in wardship rather than by way 
                                                 
9  Andrew Bainham, ‘Private and public children law: an under-explored relationship’ (2013) 25 
CFLQ 138. 
10  Considered below in text at n.131-9. 
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of applications for section 8 orders introduced by the Children Act.  The procedure adopted, it 
is argued, has determined the approach of the court to the resolution of disputes between 
parents and professionals, in adversarial proceedings of contested claims to know what is 
best for the child and in which medical best interests normally prevails. The principles and 
concepts of the Children Act as they apply to the provision of healthcare to children are then 
considered with respect to parental responsibilities, professional duties, the responsibilities of 
public authorities and the approach to the court to the determination of disputes.  A detailed 
examination of the principles and concepts of the Children Act of parental responsibility, 
working together, the welfare principle and checklist and placing the child at the centre of care, 
demonstrates that their utility is yet to be fully realised in the context of the provision of 
healthcare to children.    
 
    
II CHILDREN’S HEALTHCARE BEFORE THE COURTS 
The first reported case in which questions concerning the provision of healthcare to a child 
were determined in legal proceedings was the case of Re D11 in 1976.  The decision of D’s 
mother and paediatrician to subject D to a sterilisation operation, and hence parental authority 
and medical paternalism, were challenged in legal proceedings initiated by an educational 
psychologist from the local education authority. Heilbron J noted that D’s ‘caring and devoted’, 
if ‘over-zealous’ mother was genuinely seeking to do her best for her daughter,12 and praised 
the exemplary care provided to D through the co-operation of a range of professionals and 
services. Emphasising the duty of the court to protect D’s rights, care for her and prevent 
future harm, her Ladyship declined to authorise the operation.13 The case prompted media 
debate in which it was argued that decisions about non-therapeutic sterilisation should not be 
left to doctors and parents but required instead ‘strict guidelines’, ‘stringent safeguards’ and 
                                                 
11  Re D (a minor) (wardship: sterilisation) [1976] Fam 185. 
12  Ibid., 192. 
13  Ibid., 194.  
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‘independent review’.14 Subsequently, in Re B (1988), Lord Templeman expressed the view 
that all proposals to sterilise a child should be reviewed by a judge. It was, his Lordship said, 
‘a drastic step’ which ‘vitally concerns an individual’ and involved ‘principles of law, ethics and 
medical practice’ such that it required the authority of the court.15  
 
When the court was first asked in Re B (1981)16 to determine the medical treatment of a child 
it was in order to clarify the law. The contemporaneous prosecution of Dr Arthur, who had 
prescribed nursing care and the administration of a sedative to John Pearson, a baby with 
Downs Syndrome, following his parents rejection of him, demonstrated that the law sets the 
parameters of professional conduct.17 In the context of the debate prompted by R v Arthur, the 
local authority sought a declaration from the court of the legality of respecting the decision of 
the parents of Alexandra, who also had Downs Syndrome, to decline life-saving surgery. 
Alexandra was temporarily taken into care after the court authorised procedure in the exercise 
of the public authority’s protective duties to the child, although a few months later she was 
returned to her parents’ care.18  The cases that followed Re B but preceded the Children Act, 
which came into force in its entirety in October 1991, concerned leave to apply for judicial 
                                                 
14  ‘A wise and compassionate decision’ The Times, 18 September 1975; Martin Huckerby, ‘High 
court forbids sterilization of handicapped girl aged 11’, The Times, 18 Sept 1975; ‘Sterilization 
– the need for safeguards’, The Times, 22 July 1975.   
15  Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Sterilisation) [1987] 2 WLR 1213, 1218B-C, E. 
16  In Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1981] 1 WLR 1421. 
17  In Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1981] 1 WLR 1421 followed the charge but 
preceded the trial of Dr Arthur. The original charge for murder was reduced to attempted 
murder, following the post-mortem, for which he was acquitted by the jury, R v Arthur 12 BMLR 
1, 1981. Dr Arthur maintained throughout that his professional conscience was clear as he had 
acted as a responsible paediatrician respecting the authority of the parents, Arthur Osman, 
‘Conscience is clear, murder case doctor says’, The Times, 3 April 1981. A BMJ editorial of the 
time emphasised the need for socially acceptable standards to guide doctors in the absence of 
which there was no reason to consider that judges were better placed to decide than parents 
to reach a humane decision,  Editorial Comment, ‘The Right to Live or the Right to Die’ (1981) 
283 BMJ 569. 
18  Michael Freeman, The Rights and Wrongs of Children, 1983, ch.7. 
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review of delays to children’s heart surgery,19 Gillick,20 the ability of a pregnant child to consent 
to abortion,21 refusal of consent by older children,22 and the House of Lords in Re B (1988) 
(above). Aside from Gillick and the judicial review cases, all of these cases were referred to 
court by a public authority, the local authority or health authority, asking the court to exercise 
its wardship jurisdiction. As a consequence, the focus of the judgments was upon the duties 
of the court and not upon the responsibilities of parents, professionals or the public services 
providing healthcare or responsible for child welfare.   
 
There was much uncertainty as to the effect of the Children Act upon the ability of the court to 
exercise its protective jurisdiction over children. The first question for the courts, once the 
Children Act was in force, concerned the procedure by which cases involving disputes over 
the medical treatment of children could be referred to court. This, in turn, raised the further 
question of the approach to be adopted by the courts in resolving these cases.   
 
 
A Responsibilities of the Court  
1 Invoking the court’s jurisdiction  
The Law Commission Report which preceded the Children Act, Review of Child Law, did not 
propose substantial changes to wardship, rather it sought to ‘incorporate the most valuable 
features’ of wardship whilst reducing the need to use wardship except in the most ‘unusual 
                                                 
19  Brought within a few months of each other, both concerned delays to heart surgery for a child 
due to a lack of intensive care nurses to staff beds in a paediatric intensive care ward at a 
Birmingham hospital, R v Central Birmingham Health Authority, ex parte Walker; R v Secretary 
of State for Social Services and another, ex parte Walker, CA, unreported 1987; R v Central 
Birmingham Health Authority ex parte Collier, 6 January 1988 unreported, official transcript on 
Westlaw. 
20  Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1986] AC 112. 
21  Re P (A Minor) [1986] 1 FLR 272; Re B (Wardship: Abortion) [1991] 2 FLR 426 (decided May 
1991).  
22  Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386 (decided September 1990), 
Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1992] 1 FLR 190 (decided July 1991). 
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and complex’ cases.23 The objective was to limit the use of wardship to those situations in 
which ‘continuing parental responsibility of the court’ was required24 so that the use of 
wardship would not circumvent the statutory scheme established by the Children Act.  
Individuals, authorities or organisations with a genuine interest in a child’s welfare would be 
able, with leave, to apply for a Specific Issue Order or Prohibited Steps Order both of which 
were ‘modelled on the wardship jurisdiction’.25  In making a Specific Issue Order the court 
determines a specific question in connection with parental responsibility, and a Prohibited 
Steps Order prohibits the taking of a step that could be taken by a parent in meeting his 
parental responsibility for a child, without the consent of the court, whilst the child’s parents 
retain responsibility for the child’s upbringing.26  At the time the Children Bill was before 
Parliament Lord Mackay explained that  
 
‘Specific issue orders will allow the courts to decide any individual matter on which 
those responsible for the child, or indeed the child himself, are unable to agree 
amongst themselves. It will also allow parties to seek the court's agreement to matters 
which are so serious as to appear to require the authority of the court. The power to 
make specific issue orders is broad, covering everything from disagreements about 
which school the child should attend to major decisions such as whether a child should 
undergo major and irreversible treatment such as an abortion or sterilisation’.27  
 
Whilst abortion and sterilisation are major and irreversible procedures, they do not necessarily 
require the ongoing involvement of the court.  Lord Mackay further noted that the inherent 
                                                 
23  Law Commission, Review of Child Law: Guardianship and Custody, No.172, 1988, 1.4. 
Responses to the Law Commission Working Paper on Wards of Court (Working Paper No.101, 
1987) had supported reform but only after reform of the private and public law provisions, 1.4.  
24  Ibid., Law Commission, 1988, 4.40. 
25  Ibid., 4.20, 4.41.  
26  Children Act 1989, s.8(1), hence, along with the Child Arrangements Order, referred to as 
section 8 orders. 
27  Lord Mackay, ‘Joseph Jackson Memorial Lecture – Perceptions of the Children Bill and beyond’ 
(1989) 139 NLJ 505. 
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jurisdiction of the High Court would, subject to leave, still be available for a ‘particularly difficult 
issue, such as an irreversible medical procedure’28 and that, ’local authorities may still invoke 
wardship for [purposes other than care proceedings], provided that there is no alternative 
statutory procedure and there is an apparent likelihood of substantial harm to the child.’29 
Together it was anticipated that the reforms would ‘substantially reduce the need to invoke the 
High Court's inherent jurisdiction’. In addition, the threshold requirements to be surpassed 
before the court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction or the local authority can intervene in 
families in public law proceedings, reflected the principle that it is ‘important for the law in a 
free society expressly to protect the integrity and independence of families save where there 
is at least likelihood of significant harm to the child from within the family’.30  
 
The procedural basis by which cases of children’s medical treatment could be brought before 
the court was directly addressed in two cases each involving an application for judicial 
authority to administer blood to a child whose parents, as Jehovah’s Witnesses, were unable 
to agree to that aspect of the treatment.31   Re O32 concerned a premature baby who had 
respiratory distress syndrome. On the Friday afternoon when O was four days old, and in 
anticipation of an emergency arising over the weekend, the local authority were consulted and 
an Emergency Protection Order was made without notice to her parents. This conferred 
parental responsibility upon the local authority which gave consent to blood transfusions. The 
local authority then applied for a Care Order. In determining that application, Johnson J was 
asked to express a view as to the appropriate procedure for such decisions. The judge 
accepted the submission that it was ‘wholly inappropriate for the court to make even an Interim 
                                                 
28  Ibid. 
29  Hansard, HL Debate, vol.502, col.493 (6 December 1988). 
30  Ibid. 
31  These cases were preceded by Re S (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 376, in which 
the local authority applied under s.100 of the Children Act for the court to exercise its inherent 
jurisdiction and then to make an order authorising the administration of blood to 4 and a half 
year-old S who was receiving treatment for T-cell leukaemia. His parents, who were Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, sought a Prohibited Steps Order. Thorpe J made the order sought by the local 
authority in the exercise of the court’s inherent jurisdiction and without comment upon matters 
of procedure. 
32  Re O (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) [1993] 2 FLR 149. 
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Care Order where the child’s parents were caring, committed and capable’ and there was only 
a single issue for determination.33 Johnson J also thought that an Emergency Protection Order 
was inappropriate, and that medical treatment cases fell outside the scope of s.44(1) of the 
Children Act.    Johnson J considered the exercise of the court’s inherent jurisdiction following 
an application under s.100 of the Children Act to be the most appropriate procedure, whenever 
possible in an inter partes hearing before a judge of the Family Division so that ‘justice is seen, 
and felt, to be done.’34  
 
In the case of Re R, which followed soon after, the local authority obtained leave to apply to 
the court for a s.8 Specific Issue Order to authorise the administration of blood to 10 month-
old R, whose parents were unable to consent to that aspect of her treatment for B-cell 
lymphoblastic leukaemia. Booth J referred to the provisions of s.100(4) of the Children Act35 
and agreed with Counsel for the authority that an application for a Specific Issue Order was 
the most appropriate procedure for such cases. Applying the welfare principle and checklist, 
the judge authorised the administration of blood in a life-threatening emergency without 
consultation with the parents, requiring consultation if the situation was not imminently life-
threatening.36 The following year, the Court of Appeal expressed the view that there were 
‘ample procedures’ to enable the involvement of the court where a child required a blood 
transfusion and the religious beliefs of his or her parents precluded consent and that the onus 
rested upon the hospital to involve the court.37  
 
                                                 
33  Re O (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) [1993] 2 FLR 149, 153. 
34  Ibid., 155.  Johnson J accepted Counsel’s argument with respect to a Specific Issue Order that 
an ‘issue’ cannot be ‘determined’ on an ex parte application. 
35  Children Act 1989, s.100(4)’ The court may only grant leave if it is satisfied that— 
(a) the result which the authority wish to achieve could not be achieved through the making of 
any order of a kind to which subsection (5) applies; and 
(b) there is reasonable cause to believe that if the court’s inherent jurisdiction is not exercised 
with respect to the child he is likely to suffer significant harm.’ 
36  Re R (minor) (Blood Transfusion) [1993] 2 FLR 757, 761. Declarations in such terms are 
standard in cases of parental inability to consent to the administration of blood due to their 
religious beliefs, eg Birmingham Children’s NHS Trust v B and C [2014] EWHC 531; M 
Children’s Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v Mr and Mrs Y [2014] EWHC 2651.  
37  Re S (A Minor) (Blood Transfusion: Adoption Order Condition) [1994] 2 FLR 416. 
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In 2004, Stephen Gilmore reviewed cases in which the court had considered applications for 
Specific Issue Orders concluding that the case law revealed ‘some uncertainty concerning the 
nature and scope of the order’.38  His review of the cases also demonstrates the limited use 
of Specific Issue Orders in cases concerned with children’s medical treatment.39  Despite the 
enactment of the Children Act, where there is an issue to be determined concerning the 
medical treatment of a child the application most often takes the form of an application for the 
court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction. In Re W, Lord Donaldson MR emphasised that the 
court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction in relation to a child whether or not the child is a 
ward of court. The difference being that if a child is a ward of court ‘no “important” or “major” 
step in a ward’s life’ can be taken without the consent of the court:40 the court can exercise its 
inherent jurisdiction without continued involvement. Whilst leave is required for non-entitled 
applicants such as an NHS Trust or local authority to apply for a Specific Issue Order41 and 
for the local authority to apply for the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction,42 the 
circumstances in which leave will be granted differ, reflecting the aim that the exercise of the 
court’s inherent jurisdiction is limited to the most serious of cases. A section 8 order requires 
leave under s.10 in which the court must have regard to ‘(a) the nature of the proposed 
application for the section 8 order; (b) the applicant’s connection with the child; (c) any risk 
there might be of that proposed application disrupting the child’s life to such an extent that he 
would be harmed by it’.43 Whereas, upon application by the local authority, the court can only 
grant leave to exercise its inherent jurisdiction if there is ‘reasonable cause to believe that if 
the court’s inherent jurisdiction is not exercised with respect to the child he is likely to suffer 
                                                 
38  Stephen Gilmore, ‘The nature, scope and use of the specific issue order’ (2004) 16 CFLQ 367-
385. 
39  In re C (A Child) (H.I.V. Testing) [2000] 2 WLR 270, considered further below. In Re K, W and 
H (Minors) (Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 854, on the question whether a consequential 
effect of the Children Act was to require a s.8 order when an older child was refusing consent 
despite written consent from his or her parents. Thorpe J described these applications as 
‘misconceived and unnecessary’.  
40  In Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court's Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64, 73. 
41  Children Act 1989, s.10(2)(b), which the court will grant if s.10(9) is fulfilled. The persons who 
are entitled to apply for a specific issue order or prohibited steps order are specified in s.10(4). 
42  Children Act 1989, s.100(3). 
43  Children Act 1989, s.10(9). 
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significant harm’44 and the authority cannot achieve the result they wish to achieve by any 
other order the local authority is entitled to apply for.45 Which, of course, includes a s.8 order. 
Other applicants, such as the NHS Trust, do not require leave to ask the court to exercise its 
inherent jurisdiction.   
 
Mostyn J observed in the recent case of Re JM46 that it might seem that cases concerning the 
medical treatment of a child ‘fall squarely’ within the scope of s.8 as the determination of a 
specific question that has arisen concerning an aspect of parental responsibility.  The Trust 
had applied for declarations of the court in the exercise its inherent jurisdiction. Following 
Booth J in Re R (above), Mostyn J had formed the view that the relief that should have been 
sought was a Specific Issue Order and gave leave to seek it. As the judge observed, the 
court’s inherent jurisdiction may not be used to ‘bypass’ legislation but may be used to ‘fill 
gaps in, or to supplement, a statutory scheme’.47  But, upon further reflection the judge thought 
that the legislature might not have had in mind the situation in which an NHS Trust is seeking 
permission to carry out serious medical treatment upon a child contrary to the wishes of the 
child’s parents, in this case removal of an aggressive cancerous tumour from J’s jaw and 
reconstruction using bone from his leg.  Mostyn J concluded that if the Trust is seeking final 
binding declarations, it should apply for leave for an application for a Specific Issue Order and 
combine that with an application for declaratory relief in the exercise of the court’s inherent 
jurisdiction.48 It should be noted that this conclusion was reached in the context of cuts to civil 
legal aid which was no longer available in applications for s.8 orders but continued to be 
available in cases concerning the exercise of the court’s inherent jurisdiction.  Such an 
approach may underscore a view of such issues as mere practicalities, tangential to the real 
                                                 
44  Children Act 1989, s.100(4)(b).  
45  Children Act 1989, ss.100(4)(a) and 100(5)(b). 
46  Re JM [2015] EWHC 2832. 
47  Ibid., [23]. 
48  Ibid., [24-27]. 
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issue in such cases. As Lord Woolf MR stated in Glass, refusing an application to appeal 
against the judge’s refusal to give relief in judicial review proceedings,  
 
‘I would emphasise that, particularly in regard to cases involving children, the last thing 
that the court should be concerned about is whether the right procedure has been used 
in the particular case. … The important concern of the court is to ensure that what is 
in the best interests of the child is determined, so far as the court is able to do so, on 
the material which is before it.’49 
 
Yet, as is argued below, the procedure adopted has dictated the approach of the courts to 
cases of children’s medical treatment focused upon the exercise of discretion in fulfilment of 
their own common law protective duties to the vulnerable.  Proceedings under the Children 
Act could result in a very different approach. 
 
2 Exercise of the court’s jurisdiction 
In response to media reports which questioned why the court was involved in the decision to 
separate conjoined twins, Jodie and Mary, Ward LJ explained that ‘[t]he Children Act 1989 
now contains a statutory scheme for the resolution of disputes affecting the upbringing of 
children. If a person having a recognisable interest brings such a dispute to the court, the court 
must decide it.’50 Once the jurisdiction of the court has been invoked, the responsibility for the 
decision about the child’s medical treatment is removed from his or her parents and the duty 
rests with the court to reach an independent decision.51 As Lord Donaldson MR stated in Re 
R, the court does not ‘step into the shoes of the parent’. The jurisdiction of the court is not 
‘derivative from the parents’ rights and responsibilities’ rather it ‘derives from, or is, the 
                                                 
49  R v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust, ex parte Glass [1999] 2 FLR 905, 910. Judicial review 
proceedings were not appropriate as the issue was a difference of opinion between David 
Glass’s mother and treating doctors about his prognosis and hence future treatment. 
50  In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147, 179.,  
51  Ibid., 179. 
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delegated performance of the duties of the Crown to protect its subjects and particularly 
children who are the generations of the future’.52  When issues of a child’s medical treatment 
are brought before the court,  
 
‘in the exercise of its wardship jurisdiction the first and paramount consideration is the 
well being, welfare, or interests (each expression occasionally used, but each, for this 
purpose, synonymous) of the human being concerned, that is the ward herself or 
himself.’53 
 
Balcombe LJ suggested in Re W that, where the issue concerns the upbringing of the child, 
s.1(1) of the Children Act now gives statutory effect to the paramountcy of the welfare of the 
child.54 Although, it is argued below that the approach to determining the welfare of the child 
under s.1(1) and s.1(3) of the Children Act is very different to that of the court in wardship 
proceedings.  
 
The Court of Appeal in Re W was concerned, amongst other things, with the powers of the 
court in cases of children’s medical treatment following the Children Act, in light of Gillick and 
the interpretation there given to s.8 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969.55  Reflective of the 
Children Act principle that where a child is in local authority care, the local authority should 
make decisions about the upbringing of the child, the authority could not seek a Specific Issue 
Order56 and s.100(2) of the Children Act meant that W could not be made a ward of court so 
the local authority applied under s.100(3) for leave to apply for the court to exercise its inherent 
jurisdiction. The local authority wanted to know whether it would be lawful to provide treatment 
to W against her wishes but did not, at that time, have any specific treatment in mind.57 Nolan 
                                                 
52  Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1992] 1 FLR 190, 200. 
53  Re B (a minor) (wardship: sterilisation) [1988] AC 199, 202, per Lord Hailsham. 
54  In Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court's Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64, 85. 
55  Ibid. Lord Donaldson MR was also responding to criticism of his earlier judgment in Re R. 
56  Children Act 1989, s.9(1). 
57  In Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court's Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64, 73. 
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LJ emphasised that, whereas Gillick had been concerned with the extent of parental rights 
over the welfare of the child, Re W concerned the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction,58 in which 
the court had powers that were ‘theoretically limitless’.59 As Nolan LJ explained the court has 
the power and responsibility, where it considers it to be necessary in the best interests of the 
child, to override the views of both the child and the parent.60  Furthermore, their Lordships 
emphasised, that the powers of the court exceed those of natural parents in that the court can 
override consent to medical treatment provided by a child aged 16 or older or Gillick competent 
whereas those with parental responsibility cannot.61 Whilst Re W concerned the powers of the 
court where it is asked to make decisions with respect to a child by the holder of parental 
responsibility, this approach to the powers of the court has been adopted in subsequent cases 
arising from a difference of opinion between a child’s parents and treatment team about the 
medical treatment of a child.  
 
First, the Court of Appeal, allowing the appeal in Re T on the first post-Children Act occasion 
that it considered the medical treatment of a young child, emphasised that the court does not 
merely review the reasonableness of the parental decision but reaches an independent 
determination of the best interests of the child.62  A few years later, in Re A, Ward LJ quoted 
from the pre-Children Act Re B63 (above) emphasising that the decision of parents might be 
genuine, reasonable, responsible and caring but once referred to court the matter is for the 
court to decide.64  The judge is not limited to choosing between the treatment regime preferred 
by either the treating professionals or the child’s parents.  Independent judicial assessment 
                                                 
58  Ibid., 93. 
59  Ibid., 81, Lord Donaldson MR. 
60  Ibid., 93. 
61  A refusal of medical treatment by a child can be overridden by those with parental responsibility 
as well as the court, Ibid., 83-84. 
62  Re T (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1997] 1 WLR 242. 
63  Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1981] 1 WLR 1424. 
64  In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147, 179.  
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may, as in private law cases under the Children Act, mean that neither parties’ preference is 
secured.65   
 
In determining applications concerning the medical treatment of a child the judiciary focus 
upon their own duty to protect, making their own assessment of the welfare of the child.66  The 
standard, derived from the speech of Lord Upjohn in J v C  is that of the ‘judicial reasonable 
parent’, ‘reflecting and adopting the changing views as the years go by of reasonable men and 
women, the parents of children, on the proper treatment and methods of bringing up 
children.’67 The Court must decide ‘exercising the authority of the Crown as national’, rather 
than natural, parent.68  Whilst the court will not lightly override the natural parent the judge is 
required to act as a ‘wise parent’,69 ‘viewing the evidence more broadly from the standpoint of 
his own perception of the child’s welfare when appraised in all its aspects’.70  Ward J stated in 
Re E that the standard was that of the ‘ordinary mother and father’, an objective standard 
which was subjective to the extent that it was the welfare of the particular child under 
consideration, in that case, in light of his age and religious upbringing.71 
 
How might the judicial, national, reasonable, parent differ in assessment of welfare from 
natural parents?  As Butler-Sloss LJ explained in Re T the duty of the court is to undertake an 
independent assessment of the welfare of the child in the context of all the relevant facts 
including the view of the child’s parents - depending upon the court’s assessment of those 
views.72  Ward LJ said in Re A, ‘Since the parents have the right in the exercise of their parental 
responsibility to make the decision, it should not be a surprise that their wishes should 
                                                 
65  An NHS Trust v MB [2006] EWHC 507. 
66  Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386, 391. 
67  Re D (a minor) (wardship: sterilisation) [1976] Fam 185, 194, Heilbron J quoting Lord Upjohn 
in J v C [1970] AC 668, 722-723.  
68  Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1992] 1 FLR 190, 202, Staughton LJ. 
69  Re D (a minor) (wardship: sterilisation) [1976] Fam 185, 194. 
70  Re T (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1997] 1 WLR 242, 254, Waite LJ. 
71  Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386, 392-3. 
72  Re T (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1997] 1 WLR 242, 250. 
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command very great respect. Parental right is, however, subordinate to welfare.’73 This may 
lead the court to authorise treatment contrary to parental judgment or conscience.  Conversely, 
judges have repeatedly stated that a court cannot require a doctor to treat contrary to their 
clinical judgment74 or professional conscience.75  If the court were to disagree with professional 
judgment, agreeing with parental assessment of the welfare of the child, the Trust would have 
a duty to assist the parents to find alternative means of securing the treatment. But there are 
no examples of this in the reported judgments.76  
 
Judges repeat that they approach the welfare of the child ‘in the widest sense and to include 
every kind of consideration capable of impacting on the decision. These include, non-
exhaustively, medical, emotional, sensory (pleasure, pain and suffering) and instinctive (the 
human instinct to survive) considerations.’77 Judgments are informed by the medical opinion 
of the child’s treating team, parental views and opinions – both perhaps gaining some clarity 
in formulation of a written statement or cross questioning – with the addition of views from 
independent experts. Judgments are reached through a balance sheet of benefits and 
burdens framed by abstract principles such as sanctity of life, quality of life, unique value of 
life, and dignity as a human being rather than the specific experiences of the individual child. 
In the majority of cases, with the notable exception of Re T,78 it is the objectivity of prevailing 
                                                 
73  In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147, 193. 
74  In re J (A Minor) [1992] 3 WLR 507, 516, Lord Donaldson MR. Although Lord Woolf MR qualified 
this as subject to the power of the court to decide according to the best interests of the child, 
this qualification has not been made in subsequent cases, R v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust, 
ex parte Glass [1999] 2 FLR 905. 
75  Re Wyatt [2005] EWHC 2293, [32] Hedley J identifying a four-fold categorisation of 
disagreement. 
76  In Simms v Simms [2002] EWHC 2734, Butler-Sloss P invited the Department of Health to 
assist in the arrangements for the provision of experimental treatment to two patients, one a 16 
year-old child, with v-CJD where the court had authorised the treatment as in the best interests 
of the patients but two committees of the hospital had not approved the treatment.    
77  An NHS Trust v A [2007] EWHC 1696, [40]. 
78  At first sight the case of In the Matter of Ashya King (a Child) [2014] EWHC 2964 may appear 
to be a further example. However, the preference of Ashya’s parents for Proton Beam Therapy 
was not opposed by his doctors; but they were not able to provide it as it was not at that time 
available in the UK and NHS England had refused to fund his treatment abroad. By the time 
his treatment was considered by Baker J in wardship proceedings, the judge was assured that 
the financial arrangements were in place for him to be provided with private treatment in 
Prague.   
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medical opinion which persuades the court of the welfare of the child, indicative of a distance 
between the views of national and natural parents.    
 
Recently, the High Court has accepted the application of the propositions developed by the 
courts to guide their decision-making in cases of withdrawing or withholding treatment to the 
determination of the provision of treatment to children.  Originating from the judgments of the 
Court of Appeal in the 1990 case of Re J,79 set out as ‘intellectual milestones’ by the Court of 
Appeal in Wyatt, 80 and as ten propositions by Holman J in Re MB,81 these summarise the 
legal framework for judicial determination detailed above then note the weight to be given to 
prolongation of life, pain and suffering, and to the sanctity and quality of life.  In An NHS Trust 
v A,82 Holman J explained that he considered the propositions to be a fair and accurate 
summary of the law and equally applicable as a guide for deciding cases whether it was the 
doctors or the parents who wished for treatment to be administered, withheld or withdrawn. 
More recently, Mostyn J in Re JM explained that he viewed these propositions as a ‘fuller 
explication’ of the principle of the paramountcy of the welfare of the child guiding the court in 
the exercise of its powers equally applicable as a guide to the court in judicial decisions on the 
provision of treatment as to decisions concerning the withholding or withdrawal of treatment.83  
 
Despite the obligations imposed upon individual healthcare practitioners, NHS Trusts, local 
authorities and the courts by the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA),84 the courts have declined 
the opportunity to ‘re-cast in a human rights framework’ the principles governing determination 
of children’s healthcare.85  The Court of Appeal swiftly overturned the rights-based judgment 
                                                 
79  Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam 33. 
80  Wyatt & Another v Portsmouth Hospital NHS & Another [2005] EWCA Civ 1181, [87] approving 
Hedley J in the court below Portsmouth NHS Trust v Wyatt [2004] EWHC 2247. 
81  An NHS Trust v MB [2006] EWHC 507, [16]. 
82  An NHS Trust v A [2007] EWHC 1696, [40].  
83  Re JM [2015] EWHC 2832, Mostyn J, [14]. 
84  Human Rights Act 1998, s.6(3). 
85  Jane Fortin, ‘The HRA’s impact on litigation involving children and their families’ (1999) 11 
CFLQ 237, 239. 
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of Laws J in the judicial review of the refusal of Cambridge Health Authority to fund further 
treatment against leukaemia for Jaymee Bowen.86  In Re T, Waite LJ said that ‘It is not an 
occasion – even in an age preoccupied with “rights” – to talk of the rights of a child, or the 
rights of a parent, or the rights of the court’ as the paramountcy of the welfare of the child was 
the ‘sole yard-stick’.87  Whilst, in Re C (HIV), Wilson J countered the father’s submission that 
they ‘had …stood up for our rights’ with the retort that ‘This baby has rights of her own.’88 
Wilson J noted that both baby and parents had a right to respect for family life under Article 8 
but left for consideration once the HRA was in force what effect that would have upon welfare 
determinations.  Dismissing the parental application to appeal three days before the court-
authorised HIV test was due and when the whereabouts of parents and child were unknown, 
Butler-Sloss LJ likewise stressed that the case was about the rights of the child, not parental 
rights. Her Ladyship did not think it necessary to consider the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (UNCRC believing it to be ‘encapsulated in s1 of the Children Act’ 
although the UNCRC supported the conclusion that the parental views were outweighed by 
the rights of the child to ‘be properly cared for in every sense’.89  Whilst Baker J in King, stated 
that his duty was to determine Ashya’s future medical treatment with paramount consideration 
given to his welfare, and with regard to his rights under Articles 2 and 8 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR),90 the judge gave no analysis of either.91 A common 
approach is that although several articles of the ECHR are engaged in relation to issues of 
children’s healthcare, they confirm rather than ‘alter or add to established principles of English 
domestic law’ so that ‘specific consideration’ of the ECHR is not necessary.92 Whilst in Re A 
the HRA, which would be in force by the time the operation was performed, was briefly 
                                                 
86  R v Cambridge District Health Authority, ex parte B [1995] 1 FLR 1055. 
87  Re T (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1997] 1 WLR 242, 253. For critical comment see 
Andrew Bainham, 'Do Babies Have Rights?' (1997) 56 CLJ 48.  
88  In re C (A Child) (H.I.V. Testing) [2000] 2 WLR 270, 282H.   
89  Re C (HIV Test) [1999] 2 FLR 1004, 1021 
90  In the Matter of Ashya King (a Child) [2014] EWHC 2964, [30]. 
91  Ibid., [30].   
92  In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147, Robert Walker LJ, 
257; An NHS Trust v A [2007] EWHC 1696, [44]; Portsmouth NHS Trust v Wyatt [2004] EWHC 
2247 [25]. 
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mentioned, as Andrew Bainham has observed, ‘[t]he influence of rights based arguments was 
negligible if not non-existent.’93 The Article 2 rights of the twins were acknowledged but not 
analysed. Brooke LJ expressed the view that the application of the welfare principle balancing 
the conflicting interests of the babies provided justification for interference with Mary’s Article 
8(1) right to respect for private and family life.94 But his Lordship did not consider whether 
Article 8 required the court to adopt a different approach to determination of welfare.  Nor did 
the court examine the parents’ Article 8 rights to respect for private life nor the right to respect 
for the family life of them all.  Whilst the ECHR, in Glass v UK, held that David’s Article 8 right 
had been interfered with and, although his doctors had acted with a legitimate aim (in 
accordance with their clinical judgment of David’s best interests), administration of 
diamorphine against his mother’s wishes without seeking consent from the court was not 
necessary in a democratic society.95 Still, the court concluded that English Law was 
compatible with Convention Rights.  The effect, as the barrister representing David and Carol 
Glass, Barbara Hewson QC, has commented, is that the question must be referred to court 
before ‘maternal opinion’ can be overridden.96 
 
As Jonathan Montgomery has observed, the courts in healthcare decisions have not sought 
to ‘codify principles, preferring to use the concept of best interests as a way to resolve 
individual disputes without articulating precise legal rules.’97 Whilst judges approach these 
cases with the utmost care, they cannot avoid becoming adversarial battles between the 
claims of adults with different experiences and perspectives to know what is best for a child, 
one of which prevails. Court proceedings are stressful for parents and professionals alike, can 
have a detrimental effect upon the relationships of care and distract attention from the needs 
                                                 
93  Andrew Bainham ‘Can We Protect Children and Protect their Rights?’ (2002) Fam Law 279.  
94  In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147, Brooke LJ, 238. 
95  Glass v United Kingdom (2004) 39 EHRR 15, [77-83].   
96  Barbara Hewson, ‘When maternal instinct outweighs medical opinion’ (2004) 154 NLJ 522. 
97  Jonathan Montgomery, ‘Law and the demoralisation of Medicine’ (2006) 26 Legal Studies 185-
210, 202. 
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of the child.98 Despite being particularistic assessments of welfare, they can appear distanced 
from the child whose medical treatment, wellbeing and future is at issue. In such 
circumstances the expropriation of the parental right to decide can leave parents unpersuaded 
that the objective assessment of the court better demonstrates appreciation of their child’s 
best interests.  The parents of Baby C took her to Australia in order to avoid the court ordered 
blood test; Neon Roberts’ mother both ignored orders of the court and appealed against them; 
JM’s parents informed the court they would not be attending the hearing of the application of 
the Trust for authority for the surgery his doctors considered he urgently required and were 
believed at that time to be in Poland. Furthermore, as Peter Cane has argued, the law is, or 
should be, ‘at least as concerned with telling us what our responsibilities are, and with 
encouraging us to act responsibly’99 as it is with accountability for past actions or the resolution 
of disputes.  With this in mind, I now turn to consider the principles and concepts of the 
Children Act. I argue that these provide a guide to parents in fulfilment of their responsibilities 
to their children, working in partnership with healthcare professionals in the provision of 
healthcare and placing duties upon public authorities to work together in the welfare of children 
and upon the courts in the resolution of disagreements which arise, putting the child at the 
centre of relationships of care. However, the utility of these principles and concepts to 
understandings of respective responsibilities, encouraging fulfilment of them and in the 
resolution of disputes have not been fully realised in the context of children’s healthcare.   
 
 
III  THE PRINCIPLES, CONCEPTS AND UTILITY OF THE CHILDREN ACT WITH 
RESPECT TO CHILDREN’S HEALTHCARE   
 
                                                 
98  Liz Forbat, Bea Teuten and Sarah Barclay, ‘Conflict escalation in paediatric services: findings 
from a qualitative study’ (2015) Arch Dis Child, doi:10.1136/archdischild-2014-307780. 
99  Peter Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (Hart 2002) 30. 
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The Law Commission’s 1988 Report, Review of Child Law: Guardianship and Custody, 
proposed a single code, a coherent framework for the ‘care, protection and upbringing of 
children and the provision of services to them and their families’100 and set of remedies for 
child law consistent across both public and private law.101  The philosophy of the Children Act 
is given effect through concepts which should inform understandings of the duties of those 
with responsibility for the welfare of children, including the provision of healthcare to children.  
 
Baroness Hale, who was the Law Commissioner responsible for the review of child law which 
resulted in the Children Act, has described parental responsibility as ‘the fundamental concept 
of the Children Act 1989 and one of its most important underlying principles.’102 Equally 
applicable to public and private law, it encapsulates both that parents have responsibilities to 
their children rather than rights over them and that children are primarily the responsibility of 
their parents, not the state.103  As Baker J stated in his judgment in the high-profile case of 
Ashya King, it is thus a ‘fundamental principle of family law in this jurisdiction that responsibility 
for making decisions about a child rest with his parents. In most cases, the parents are the 
best people to make decisions about a child’104 and parents are given considerable freedom 
to take responsibility for their child’s upbringing and welfare.  However, ‘the concept of 
partnership’ whilst, as Baroness Hale has explained, ‘not expressed in the Act; … is certainly 
an underlying principle; and that principle is ‘one of working together in the interests of the 
child.’105 The responsibility of public institutions is to work in partnership with parents 
                                                 
100  Hansard, HL Debates, vol.502, col.488 (6 December 1988). 
101  Law Commission, Review of Child Law: Guardianship and Custody, No.172, 1988, 1.5; 
following four Consultation Papers on Guardianship, No.91, 1985; Custody, No.96, 1986; Care, 
Supervision and Interim Orders in Custody Proceedings, No.100, 1987, Wards of Court, 
No.101, 1987.  
102  Writing after time as Law Commissioner and before her appointment to the judiciary, Brenda 
Hoggett, Parents and Children: The Law of Parental Responsibility, 1993, 9, emphasis in the 
original.  
103  Law Commission, Review of Child Law: Guardianship and Custody, No.172, 1988, 2.1. 
Reflecting both a lack of confidence in the state and an emphasis upon individual responsibility 
and choice, John Eekelaar, Family Law and Personal Life, 2006, 16.  
104  In the Matter of Ashya King (A Child) [2014] EWHC 2964, [31]. 
105  Brenda Hale, ‘In Defence of the Children Act’ (2000) Archives of Diseases of Childhood 463, 
http://adc.bmj.com/content/83/6/463.full.pdf+html (last accessed 9/1/17). 
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supporting them to fulfil their responsibility to their children and to work together to prevent the 
need for compulsory action or court orders. The principle of partnership thus applies both 
between parents and authorities and to inter-agency co-operation to secure the welfare of 
children.  The ‘prior claim’ of parents to responsibility can be interfered within the interests of 
the child’s welfare,106 although compulsory intervention is limited to circumstances where 
parental care places the child at unacceptable risk of harm. Where the state becomes 
involved, in either private disputes or public proceedings, decisions are made according to the 
welfare of the child.  This may lead the court to the conclusion that it should not intervene, 
applying the principle of no unnecessary order.  Where the court does intervene, the welfare 
of the child is the paramount consideration and the state can place limits upon the exercise of 
parental responsibility in the interests of the child’s welfare.  
 
The Children Act places the child at the centre of relationships of care and, reflecting Gillick, 
emphasises both respect for the individual child and protection of his or her welfare.  Applying 
the principles of the Children Act whilst also respecting the human rights of the child would 
support the Children Act’s emphasis upon recognition of the child as an individual, not just a 
‘clinical problem[] with a collection of symptoms’.107 All children have independent interests 
under the Article 8 right to respect for private and family life, to respect for physical, bodily and 
personal integrity, which may need to be balanced with the parental right to respect for private 
and family life. Interference with either will require justification.  Decisions about the medical 
treatment of a child may engage the child’s Article 2 right to life which places upon public 
authorities a negative obligation and a positive obligation to do ‘all that can be reasonably 
expected of them to avoid a real and immediate risk to life of which they have or ought to have 
knowledge’.108  Consideration of the rights of the child alongside his or her welfare, therefore, 
                                                 
106  Law Commission, Review of Child Law: Guardianship and Custody, No 172, 1988, 1.5.  
107  Learning from Bristol: The Report of the Public Inquiry into Children’s Heart Surgery at the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995, CM5207(1), July 2001, ch.23, paras.1-2. 
108  Osman v United Kingdom [1999] 1 FLR 193, [116], An NHS Foundation Hospital v P [2014] 
EWHC 1650, [15], Andrew Bainham, ‘Can we Protect Children and Protect their Rights? (2002) 
32 Family Law 279. 
 24 
would ensure that the individual interests of all involved are identified, evaluated and any 
interference justified in the discharge of professional duties whether healthcare professional, 
Trust manager or judge.109  The conclusion of the ECHR in Glass v UK (noted above),110 may 
have afforded sufficient protection to the rights of the child on the facts of that case in which 
the mother refused her consent to palliative care in preference for active treatment for her 
child, rejecting the medical view that he was dying.  But what of the rights of the child in the 
situation where a parent is refusing to allow doctors to provide recommended treatment to 
their child, delaying treatment, or threatening to remove the child from hospital to avoid 
treatment?  Although the application of the HRA to children’s healthcare is not the purpose 
and is beyond the scope of this article, it is acknowledged that to read the provisions of the 
Children Act in light of the obligations imposed by the HRA would support a child-centred 
approach which protects the welfare and interests of the individual child whilst recognising 
relationships of care.   
 
 
A Parental Responsibility for Children’s Healthcare 
The law imposes a duty upon anyone caring for children, and not just those with parental 
responsibility, to seek medical advice.  Failure to do so, deliberately, recklessly or due to a 
lack of care whether assistance is required111 can amount to the criminal offence of child 
neglect112 and, if the child dies, to murder or manslaughter.113  This reflects the particular 
vulnerability of children and the state’s interest in ensuring the wellbeing of children by putting 
those caring for children under a duty to act, in this context to secure medical assistance, as 
                                                 
109  Jane Fortin, Children’s Rights and the Developing Law, (CUP, Cambridge, 2009) 363-371. 
110  Glass v United Kingdom (2004) 39 EHRR 15.  
111  R v Sheppard [1981] AC 394, 418. 
112  Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s.1(2), failure by the child’s parent, legal guardian or 
other person ‘legally liable to maintain a child’ to provide, or to take steps to procure medical 
aid, amounts to the offence of child neglect in s.1(1).  This section also makes it an offence for 
a person over the age of 16 with responsibility for the child to wilfully assault, ill-treat, neglect, 
abandon or expose in a manner likely to cause unnecessary suffering or injury to health. R v 
Hayles [1969] 1 QB 364; R v Wills [1990] Crim L R 714. 
113  R v Harris and another 23 BMLR 122, 1994.  
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well as a duty to take care when acting.  The vast majority of parents or carers of children will 
seek medical assistance for the child in their care not to avoid criminal sanctions but because 
they are concerned for the life, health and wellbeing of their child. The offence will become 
relevant in those cases where parents fail to seek, or avoid, medical care, not where those 
with responsibility to provide care disagree about which treatment is best for the child.  
Consistent with the criminal law provision, s.3(5) permits anyone in whose care a child is to 
‘do what is reasonable in all the circumstances of the case for the purpose of safeguarding or 
promoting the child’s welfare’, enabling them to make necessary decisions where they have 
to be made before the person with parental responsibility can be contacted. The Law 
Commission gave the example that this would permit someone caring for a child whilst his or 
her parents were on holiday to ensure the child received treatment following an accident, but 
it would not permit them to arrange major elective surgery.114   
 
The Law Commission considered that framing the legal relationship between parent and child 
in terms of responsibility would ‘reflect the everyday reality of being a parent’,115 focused upon 
the practicalities of caring for children and ‘taking responsibility for the safety, nurture and 
upbringing of the child’.116 The change in the discourse from parental rights was to reflect the 
‘practical reality’ that caring for children is a ‘serious responsibility’ rather than a theoretical 
exercise of rights.117 The Law Commission expressed this in strident terms: ‘Parental 
responsibility should mean what it says. The power to control a child’s upbringing should go 
hand in hand with the responsibility to look after him or to at least see that he is properly looked 
after.’118 
 
                                                 
114  Law Commission, Review of Child Law: Guardianship and Custody, No.172, 1988, 2.16. 
115  Ibid., 2.4. 
116  Baroness Brenda Hale of Richmond, ‘Family Responsibility: Where are We Now?’ in Jo 
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117  Brenda Hoggett, ‘The Children Bill: The Aim’ [1989] Family Law 217-221, 217.   
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Parental responsibility is defined in s.3(1) of the Children Act as ‘all the rights, duties, powers, 
responsibilities and authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation to the child and 
his property.’119 The concept thus encapsulates the entire ‘bundle of duties towards the child 
with their concomitant powers and authority over him together with some procedural rights to 
protection from interference’120 variously expressed in different legislative provisions.  Parental 
responsibilities change according to needs and circumstances and, as in Gillick, with the age 
and maturity of the child.121  It is parental responsibility which gives the holder the duty, powers 
and authority to provide day-to-day care and to make major decisions concerning a child’s 
health and wellbeing from a visit to the GP for treatment for a persistent cough, to making 
decisions about a child’s treatment for cancer, to agreeing to the cessation of active treatment 
and the provision of palliative care to a child with a life-limiting condition. The Children Act left 
it to the courts to consider what the concept of parental responsibility means in the variety of 
instances in which it might apply. Yet, with respect to a child’s medical treatment, the courts 
have retained the legal discourse of parental responsibility as a right and duty122 and have not 
examined what differences, to parental duties, result from the introduction of the concept of 
parental responsibility. What can we say of parental responsibility for children’s health from 
other cases concerning parental responsibility?  
 
For many children there will be two holders of parental responsibility, their biological 
parents.123  Amendments to the Children Act in the intervening years enable step-parents and 
civil partners to acquire parental responsibility124 and enact specific rules for children born 
following assisted reproduction.125  Reflecting the principle that the key purpose of parental 
                                                 
119  It was accepted in In Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court's Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64, 
78, that decisions about a child’s medical treatment come within parental responsibility.   
120  Brenda Hoggett, ‘The Children Bill: The Aim’ [1989] Family Law 217, 217.  
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Acquired by the unmarried father, Children Act 1989, s.4. 
124  Children Act 1989, ss.4(A).  
125  Children Act 1989, ss.2(1A); 4ZA. 
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responsibility is to enable the holder to care for the child, the Children Act provides for others 
to acquire parental responsibility, for example, where a Child Arrangements Order has been 
made naming a child’s grandparents as the persons with whom she shall live they will also 
have parental responsibility for her, whilst the order is in force, to enable them to care for her 
including full authority with respect to decisions about her medical treatment.  When the court 
makes an order which confers parental responsibility upon an adult it may place limits upon 
its scope. In Re D (Contact and Parental Responsibility: Lesbian Mothers and Known Father), 
Black J made a Parental Responsibility Order in favour of D’s biological father; D’s biological 
mother and her partner already had parental responsibility. The judge also placed conditions, 
which the father had proposed, upon the order including that he would not contact any health 
professional involved in 5 year-old D’s care for juvenile idiopathic arthritis without the prior 
written consent of her mothers.  In return, her mothers were expected to keep him informed 
about the medical issues concerning D.126  Similarly, limits were placed upon the mother’s 
exercise of her parental responsibility when the judge made private law orders determining a 
number of issues about the post-separation parental care of four year-old, N. The judge 
ordered that should a blood transfusion or any other medical treatment be recommended for 
N when he was in his mother's care, the mother, who was a Jehovah’s Witness, should provide 
the contact details of the father and inform the medical professionals and authorities of his 
ability to consent.127 In both cases, limits were placed upon the exercise of parental 
responsibility in the interests of the welfare of the child. 
 
Section 2(5) of the Children Act provides that there can be more than one holder of parental 
responsibility with respect to a child at any time, enabling, for example, the child’s father to 
agree to the x-ray of a suspected broken limb in the absence of the child’s mother. Parental 
responsibility is therefore often shared and a parent does not lose parental responsibility 
                                                 
126  Re D (Contact and Parental Responsibility: Lesbian Mothers and Known Father) [2006] EWHC 
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where another acquires it through agreement or court order.128   The discharge of some or all 
of their responsibilities may be delegated to another holder, other individuals or agencies such 
as schools, holiday clubs or the local authority.129 This permits someone without parental 
responsibility, say a child’s grandmother, who looks after the child whilst her parents are at 
work, for example, to take the child to the GP and to administer antibiotics prescribed for an 
ear infection. But parental responsibility cannot be surrendered or transferred to another, it 
ends only with an adoption or parental order (following a surrogacy agreement), when the 
child reaches the age of 18, or upon the death of child or holder of parental responsibility.130  
 
To enable the care of children, s.2(7) provides that each holder of parental responsibility can, 
unless legislation provides otherwise, exercise it independently.  Through case law, the courts 
have added to these exceptions ritual male circumcision and immunisation against infectious 
diseases. The law gives parents ‘a large measure of autonomy in the way in which they 
discharge their parental responsibilities’131 so that, where holders of parental responsibility are 
agreed, the former is not prohibited and the latter is not compulsory. But, in the event of a 
disagreement amongst holders of parental responsibility, the matter must be referred to court 
for either a Specific Issue Order or Prohibited Steps Order.   
 
The approach adopted by the courts to the resolution of parental disagreements over the 
‘preventative healthcare’ issue of immunisation against infectious diseases originates in the 
judgment of Sumner J in Re C, approved on appeal.132  Applying the welfare checklist, Sumner 
J first considered the medical evidence in relation to each vaccination, the wishes of 10 year-
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old F, whilst ‘largely discounting’ those wishes because she would accept the decision of the 
court, and the harm each child was at risk of suffering if they remained unvaccinated. Further, 
Sumner J considered the children’s emotional needs, recognising the risk of a damaging effect 
upon the bond between primary carer and the child of immunisation against the committed 
values of the primary carer.  Whilst recognising that the application was an ‘affront to the 
beliefs’ of the mother of 4 year-old C, who adopted natural parenting and holistic health, 
Sumner J determined that a programme of vaccinations was in the best interests of both 
children. In F v F,133 Thesis J emphasised that parents are encouraged to agree on the issue 
of immunisation, an exercise of parental responsibility usually ‘negotiated’ between the 
parents and then put into effect.  The judge stressed that it would have been best for the 
children had the parents reached an agreement but, as they had been unable to, it had fallen 
to the court to decide in the welfare interests of each child. As the court had now exercised 
judgment on that issue of parental responsibility, it was incumbent upon the parents to 
‘exercise their parental responsibility in the light of the court’s decision’ to ‘ensure that the 
consequences of the court’s decision will be managed in a responsible way.’134  The 
application of the welfare principle has been criticised in these cases. Richard Huxtable has 
argued that immunisation is a public health issue which may be considered to be of greater 
benefit to society more generally rather than in the interests of the individual child.  Whilst 
Emma Cave has argued that insufficient respect was given to the views of the older children.135  
However, as one of the few examples of s.8 orders with respect to children’s health, these 
cases do show the potential, as yet unrealised, for placing decisions within the context of the 
realities of parenting and for the development of a principled approach to the limits of freedom 
in the exercise of parental responsibility through a wider view of the welfare of the individual 
child.           
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Where clinically indicated the courts have been prepared to authorise male circumcision, 
whilst requiring the procedure to be performed in hospital and any ‘religious ceremonies’ 
observed to be ‘consistent with the practice at the hospital.’136  As a consequence of the 
freedom parents have to raise their children according to their values and beliefs, as Sir James 
Munby observed in Re B and G (Children), non-therapeutic male circumcision performed for 
‘social, societal, cultural, customary or conventional’ reasons is tolerated as within the sphere 
of ‘reasonable’ parenting.137   But where an irreversible operation is not medically necessary 
it should only be carried out with the agreement of both parents or upon the authority of the 
court.138  Where parents disagree and the child is experiencing two religious upbringings which 
adopt different stances on the issue, the principles of the Children Act require the court to 
adopt a child-centred approach which does not assume that the child will share the views of 
either parent.  The court will give weight to the welfare and the developing capacity of the child 
respecting the child as an individual who will develop his or her own values and beliefs and 
decisions made now should respect their freedom to do so. That may lead to the conclusion 
there should be no order, leaving the decision to the child once they have the maturity to make 
their own choice according to their own values.139      
 
Subsequent to the Children Act but following Re B (1988) (above), Peter Singer QC said in 
Re HG that, ‘one of the responsibilities incorporated into the definition of parental responsibility 
is a responsibility to bring before a High Court judge the question whether your child should 
be sterilised’.140  Confined to non-therapeutic sterilisation141 parents freedom to exercise their 
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parental responsibility is thus limited in the interests of child welfare.  The willingness of the 
courts to give authority, justified in terms of protection and care, has been subjected to much 
criticism.142 Although the more cautious approach subsequently established by the Court of 
Appeal in two cases concerning adults, Re A and Re SL,143 must be equally applicable to 
children. The guidelines or safeguards which the case of Re D had demonstrated a need for 
did not materialise. Had these cases come before the courts in applications for s.8 orders, a 
careful application of the principles and concepts of the Children Act may have ensured a 
child-centred approach which may have recognised the need for the state to work together to 
support parents of children with learning difficulties rather than sterilise them in their efforts to 
care.  
    
Unlike preventative healthcare and non-essential, non-therapeutic, procedures the provision 
of medical treatment recommended by responsible physicians does not require the agreement 
of all holders of parental responsibility. Disagreement between parents about a child’s medical 
treatment may present the doctor with a professional, or ethical, dilemma but no legal issue, 
as long as consent is provided by one person with authority to do so, treatment will not amount 
to a civil or criminal battery.144 In An NHS Trust v SR, Bodey J observed that the Trust need 
not have applied to court for authority to administer conventional radiotherapy and 
chemotherapy in the post-operative treatment of medulloblastoma, given the consent of 
Neon’s father. Although the judge recognised that, where parents are not agreed on treatment 
for a serious medical condition, an application by the Trust to court is understandable.145  The 
mother was vehemently opposed to the conventional treatment, which carried risks of serious 
and life-altering side effects, preferring alternative and complementary therapy.  To ensure 
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that those treating Neon had confidence in their ability to administer the treatment he required, 
Bodey J included in the orders authority for treating clinicians to act on the consent of the 
father alone, provided that the issue had been discussed with the mother where reasonable 
and practicable.146 Appreciating the stress for the mother of the court proceedings and that 
she had previously ‘panicked’ and disappeared with Neon, the court placed limits on the 
mother’s exercise of her parental responsibility through the use of orders aimed at clarifying 
the father’s authority in the interests of the welfare of the child.  
 
As Gillick established, and as Ward LJ emphasised in the post-Children Act case of the 
conjoined twins,147 parental rights are enjoyed to enable parents to fulfil their duties to their 
children,148 and must be exercised for the welfare of the child.149 As Lord Scarman explained 
in Gillick, the welfare, or best interests, principle acts as a guide for the actions and decisions 
of parents and court alike: 
'[W]hen a court has before it a question as to the care and upbringing of a child it must 
treat the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration in determining the order 
to be made. There is here a principle which limits and governs the exercise of parental 
rights of custody, care and control. It is a principle perfectly consistent with the law's 
recognition of the parent as the natural guardian of the child: but it is also a warning 
that parental right must be exercised in accordance with the welfare principle and can 
be challenged, even overridden, if it be not.'150   
As the Law Commission stated, parents cannot ‘insist upon action which is contrary to or resist 
action which will promote’ the welfare of the child,151 they are required to ‘adopt a child centred 
approach to their responsibilities in meeting the child’s welfare’.152  Parental responsibility is 
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thus primarily responsibility to the child.153 Of course, day-to-day decisions will not all be made 
always to optimise a child’s welfare, or alternatively, in relation to day-to-day matters the 
optimisation of the interests of the child includes balancing the interests of relevant others.154  
Most parenting and care of a child’s health and wellbeing takes place in the home where 
parents are at liberty to make decisions about matters such as diet, exercise, care of a child’s 
emotional wellbeing, use of natural, alternative or complementary medicines. But beyond 
everyday illnesses and cuts and bruises, a parent who has concerns about a child’s health will 
seek advice from primary healthcare services and where the child’s condition is serious be 
referred for specialist care.  In such circumstances, the welfare of the seriously ill child will be 
the focus of parental concern. Parental responsibility with respect to their child’s health is 
fulfilled by seeking the assistance of experts and by making decisions about the treatment the 
child will receive considering the information and advice provided by those with medical 
expertise; professionals who also have legal duties to the child. The provision of healthcare to 
young children is thus dependent upon a partnership between parents who have unique 
knowledge and expertise in the individual child155 and professionals with medical expertise. 
 
In the article quoted above, McFarlane LJ observed that inherent within the responsibility of 
the parent to do their best to meet the needs of the child is, where parental responsibility is 
shared, the responsibility to respect the rights of the other.156  It is not uncommon in private 
law proceedings under the Children Act for the judge to urge parents to try, in the interests of 
the welfare of the child, to reach an agreement. In the context of medical treatment, fulfilment 
of parental responsibilities to their child requires parents to work together making decisions 
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about the best interests of the child.  But further, parental responsibility to their child requires 
parents to respect the co-existing duties of healthcare professionals and public authorities and 
places them under a duty to work together in the welfare of the child.  In the vast majority of 
cases parents will work together in partnership with healthcare professionals appreciating their 
dependency upon them to ensure that their child receives the medical care they require. But 
where parents disagree with professionals about the best interests of their child they may need 
to be reminded of the importance of working together with professionals in the partnership of 
care.  Bodey J in An NHS Trust v SR expressed the hope that Neon’s mother would accept 
the decision of the court and ‘support him through the very difficult times ahead. N clearly 
needs both his parents to be pulling together alongside the treating team and nothing could 
be worse than for him to pick up on any sense of maternal opposition to the treatment.’157  This 
is reflected also in the comments of Butler-Sloss LJ in Re C (HIV) (above), the emphasis upon 
the clinical purpose of consent ensuring the confidence and commitment of the patient or their 
carer to the proposed treatment emphasised in Re T158 and behind the words of Hedley J 
when he urged Charlotte Wyatt’s parents to ‘seize this opportunity constructively to build upon 
their trust and confidence in Dr ‘K’ and the staff who have committed themselves in such 
exemplary fashion to her case’.159  As McFarlane LJ said, ‘‘the courts are entitled to look to 
each parent to use their best endeavours to deliver what that child needs, hard or burdensome 
or downright tough though that may be’.160  Parents have a responsibility to their child to 
respect the legal duties of healthcare professionals and to work together with professionals in 
a partnership of care for the child.      
 
B Parent/Professional Partnership in the Provision of Healthcare to Children   
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Stephen Gilmore has argued that Gillick established that the limits of parental discretion are 
set by both the welfare of the child and when their protective role can be abandoned because 
the child has the capacity to exercise independent judgment to consult with healthcare 
professionals.161 In the same way, with respect to young and dependent children, the limits of 
parental discretion are, I argue, set by the duty to work together in the best interests of the 
child with professionals in the fulfilment of their legal duties to children in their care framed at 
the boundaries by the ordinary principles of criminal and civil law supplemented by standards 
of professional conduct.162  
  
The House of Lords in Gillick recognised that there would be circumstances in which doctors 
would be justified in treating a child without the consent of someone with authority.  Notably, 
Lord Scarman referred to ‘exceptional situations’ such as ‘emergency, parental neglect, 
abandonment of the child, or inability to find the parent’ when the doctor would be justified in 
providing treatment without the knowledge or consent of the child’s parents.163 Lord 
Templeman recognised that it may not be possible to obtain a court order prior to the provision 
of emergency treatment necessary for the survival or health of a child without parental 
consent. In such circumstances, his Lordship said, the doctor should have the ‘courage of his 
convictions’ that the treatment is ‘necessary and urgent’. Professional legal duties to the child 
take precedence.  If need be, the court will ‘approve after the event treatment which the court 
would have authorised in advance’.164  
 
Gillick precedes the Children Act and it is possible that s.3(5) could be relied upon to justify 
the provision of treatment without parental consent, although with few cases of a child’s 
medical treatment directly informed by the Children Act there is no direct authority that it 
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extends to such circumstances. In R (on the application of G) v Nottingham City Council,165 
Munby J said, obiter, that s.3(5) may justify medical treatment of a child without parental 
consent or a court order in an emergency to prevent irreversible harm and ‘if parents are acting 
unreasonably or contrary to the child's best interests, even despite a parental refusal of 
consent’.166  In other circumstances, healthcare professionals require the consent of someone 
with parental responsibility or the authority of the court before administering medical treatment 
to a child in their care.  Legally consent is the ‘‘flak jacket' which protects the doctor from claims 
by the litigious’.167 Consent provides the doctor with the authority to provide the proposed 
treatment without requiring them to if, in their professional judgment, it is no longer in the 
child’s best interests.  Consent does not impose an obligation to treat.168 Professional 
judgement still needs to be exercised.    
 
Healthcare practitioners have legal duties of care to act in ‘accordance with good medical 
practice recognised as appropriate by a competent body of professional opinion’169 in 
diagnosis, identification of treatment options and treatment. They have a duty to provide 
information about the ‘material risks’ of significance to the reasonable parent in the position of 
the parent or of which the doctor is, or should reasonably be, aware that the particular parent 
is likely to attach significance.170 In his October 2005 judgment concerning the medical 
treatment of Charlotte Wyatt, Hedley J considered an application by her parents, given 
evidence of improvement in her condition, for a discharge of the declaration which authorised 
withholding of ventilation and an application by the Trust for a declaration that in the event of 
an irreconcilable difference her doctors should decide about her treatment. Discharging the 
declaration, Hedley J was concerned to explain the nature and limits of the duties of doctors. 
The judge emphasised that the doctor’s duty is to the patient. Doctors have a ‘professional 
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duty’ to act in the best interests of the child171 and advise parents accordingly about the 
medical facts and the decision to be made.172 Fulfilment of the doctor’s duty, in turn, enables 
parents to fulfil their duty to consent to the medical treatment from the range of clinically 
indicated alternatives which, in their evaluation, is in the best interests of their child.   
 
Further, Hedley J stressed that it is the responsibility of doctors to work in partnership with the 
child’s parents.173 Reflective of the principles and concepts of the Children Act, this view was 
informed by the 1990 case of Re J in which the Court of Appeal considered an appeal by the 
Official Solicitor against the decision of Scott Baker J authorising the hospital to withhold 
mechanical ventilation from Baby J in the event that he stopped breathing. Ordinarily, Lord 
Donaldson MR observed, the care and treatment of a child would be ‘discussed and decided 
by the doctors in consultation with the parents.’174 An effective partnership, he considered, 
would mean that parents would have confidence in the doctors, that doctors would recognise 
the agonising dilemma of the parents and take the time required to explain the limited options 
available leading to agreement on the appropriate course of action.  Doctors are under a 
‘responsibility to work in partnership with parents’175 through a process of discussion and 
negotiation, to agree a treatment plan reflecting their parental and professional judgment of 
the best interests of the child accommodating parental wishes as far as ‘professional judgment 
and conscience’ allows.176  In other words, the partnership between parents and professionals 
is framed by the responsibility of parents to their child and the legal duties of professionals to 
the child in their care requiring them to work together to determine what is best for the child. 
Together, the child’s parents and treating team have the knowledge, expertise and skills with 
respect to the specific needs of the particular child arising from their respective roles, 
responsibilities and relationships with the child. Working in partnership requires a professional 
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response to a deteriorating relationship, breakdown in trust or parental disengagement. 
Communication is essential.  A principle of the Children Act is that court orders should be 
avoided if at all possible. When professionals disagree with parental decisions about what is 
best for the child, they should first seek to ensure that the parents understand the facts and 
that they understand the reasons for the parental view. Where there is disagreement, fulfilment 
of professional duties may require doctors to engage in further discussion, secure second 
opinions, involve support and advocacy services, or ethical and religious advisors in the 
attempt to reach agreement on the best interests of the child. Parents cannot insist on 
treatment, and doctors can refuse treatment which they consider to be medically contra-
indicated or which they cannot conscientiously administer.177  A doctor cannot be required to 
act contrary to his or her professional conscience.178 Hedley J explained that this requires the 
doctor to consider all the circumstances, professional guidance, second opinions and arrive 
at an intellectual conclusion ‘honed by experience of patients, exposure to the practice of 
colleagues, and the ethos of his work.’179 Whilst there is no concept of professional 
responsibility comparable to parental responsibility, healthcare professionals have legal duties 
to the child, derived from common law, to be exercised in accordance with their clinical 
judgment and professional conscience. The Children Act principle of working together to 
support parents to fulfil their parental responsibilities and the principle of adopting the least 
interventionist approach places Trusts under an obligation to support professionals to attempt 
to resolve disagreements with parents over what is best for the child.  
 
 
C Working Together in the Provision of Healthcare to Children  
The emphasis given in the case law to the parental right to decide about their children’s 
medical treatment and, where a difference of opinion develops into an intractable conflict, the 
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duty of the public authority to seek an independent assessment of the child’s best interests by 
the court180 fails to reflect foundational principles of the Children Act.  That is, the responsibility 
upon the state ‘to help rather than to interfere’181 with the fulfilment of parental responsibility, 
and upon public bodies to work together to try to prevent the need for compulsory action, 
adopting the least interventionist approach consistent with protection of child welfare, seeking 
court orders only where necessary.  Whilst parental responsibility is primary, it co-exists with 
the responsibilities of the state to children through public protection of their welfare.  
 
Where parental refusal to consent to proposed treatment cannot be resolved by the treating 
team, the focus of the Trust must be upon their obligation to, as the ECtHR said in Glass, ‘take 
the initiative and to defuse the situation’.182 And, although in the context of the present legal 
framework for decision-making, the ECtHR held that the Trust could have brought the matter 
to court, the ECtHR also observed that the Trust had involved the police in their attempts to 
persuade the mother, which is hardly an effective prescription for reaching an agreement 
between diametrically opposed views. Research has demonstrated that a developing conflict 
between parents and professionals not only risks damaging the relationship between them 
upon which the care of the child depends but escalation can result in the conflict becoming 
the centre of attention rather than the child.183  The principles of the Children Act place the 
Trust under a duty to support the partnership of care, seek to defuse the situation, and to 
attempt to resolve the disagreement in the interests of the child whose treatment is at issue. 
This could be by facilitating further communication between parents and professionals, 
directing parents to reliable sources of independent advice, or to counselling services, or 
ensuring they get support from PALS, ethical or religious advisors.  It may secure a second 
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opinion, and explore whether consideration by the Clinical Ethics Committee, mediation or 
other alternative dispute resolution may resolve the disagreement. Working together in the 
interests of the welfare of the child, parents, professionals and the Trust have an interest in 
agreeing the way forward seeking to avoid the need to refer the question of the best treatment 
for a child to the court in potentially divisive, stressful, legal proceedings.    
 
In King, echoing the language of the Children Act provisions concerning compulsory state 
intervention, Baker J said,  
 
‘the State – whether it be the court, or any other public authority – has no business 
interfering with the exercise of parental responsibility unless the child is suffering or is 
likely to suffer significant harm as a result of the care given to the child not being what 
it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give.’184   
 
Whilst Baker J rightly observed that there is a threshold to be crossed before the state can 
intervene, he was here referring to the terms of the threshold for considering Care or 
Supervision Orders set out in s.31(2) rather than requirements for leave to apply for a Specific 
Issue or Prohibited Steps Order or even the restrictions upon applications from the local 
authority for leave for the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction.185    In the vast majority of 
cases, the specific issues of unresolved disagreement between ‘caring, committed and 
capable’186 parents and professionals concerning the child’s medical treatment, particularly 
where the child’s condition requires hospitalisation and the disagreement relates to aspects of 
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that treatment, or disagreement over alternatives, or whether it is time to move to a more 
aggressive form of treatment, can be resolved by an application by the Trust for a Specific 
Issue or Prohibited Steps Order. The potential benefits of applications for section 8 orders 
over the exercise of the court’s inherent jurisdiction are considered below.  
 
Securing the medical treatment a child requires may be more complex where treatment for 
the child’s medical condition does not require permanent hospitalisation, although this can still 
be achieved through the Children Act. This can be illustrated with the examples of the 
disagreement over the post-operative treatment following surgery to remove a 
medullablastoma for seven year-old Neon Roberts and five year-old Ashya King.  In both 
cases, an application to resolve the disagreement could have been made by the Trust for a 
Specific Issue Order. However, in both cases the hospital responded to the removal of the 
child from care at a time when post-operative treatment had become urgently necessary, by 
his mother in Neon’s case and parents in Ashya’s case.  As they were missing the order for 
Neon’s mother to attend court for the hearing on his post-operative treatment could not be 
served. The court made an Interim Care Order. When located, Neon was briefly placed in 
foster care until he could be returned to the care of his father and the order was discharged.  
Ashya King’s parents removed him from Southampton General, taking him to Spain with the 
intention of raising the money to pay for Proton Beam Therapy in Prague.  They explained that 
the relationship with his treating doctors had broken down and they believed that if they 
continued to question the treatment being offered to him the Trust would seek an Emergency 
Protection Order.187  These cases thus raise the question of the use of the compulsory public 
law powers for child protection in cases in which parents are seeking the best medical 
treatment for their child but acting in a way which, objectively, appears misguided and putting 
                                                 
187  Naveed King, ‘Real Story of Ashya King’, www.youtube.com/watch?v=14ETQn9ZPwk, posted 
30 August 2014, [last accessed 9/1/17].  Baker J was unable to find on this disputed fact, In the 
Matter of Ashya King [2014] EWHC 2964, [12]. Although as Johnson J observed in Re O¸ 
above, it is difficult to see how the threshold requirements would be satisfied. 
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the child at risk of harm. The interests of the child lie in receiving the required medical 
treatment best secured through the co-operation of the child’s parents.  
 
Where the welfare of the child requires state intervention in family life, the principles of the 
Children Act require the adoption of the least interventionist means necessary.  An Interim 
Care Order is, along with an Emergency Protection Order, a Supervision Order and a Care 
Order, an order made in the exercise of the public law provisions under the Children Act 
permitting compulsory intervention of the state, through the local authority child protection 
powers. Care Orders confer parental responsibility upon the local authority and, although the 
parents retain parental responsibility, the local authority has both the power to make decisions 
about the child’s upbringing and to determine the extent to which the parents may meet their 
parental responsibility.188  Consideration of care proceedings is appropriate where there are 
‘broader welfare considerations’, which may involve issues of medical treatment as part of a 
care plan, but care proceedings are not the appropriate mechanism through which to secure 
medical treatment which the local authority considers is in the best interests of the child in 
circumstances where the Trust declines to intervene or issue a summons.189  Neither are care 
proceedings the mechanism through which to secure the medical treatment proposed by 
professionals to which parents are in disagreement.190  As the court recognised in Re C, 191 
the threat of care proceedings may undermine trust and the 'co-operative relationship' 
between the healthcare professionals and parents working together to care for the child.192  
Threats of child protection proceedings will not defuse the situation. Such threats are more 
likely, as they did in the King case, to close down communication, further erode trust and 
                                                 
188  Children Act, 1989, s.2(6), s.33(3), (4). 
189  Local Authority v SB & AB & MB [2010] EWHC 1744, [15], [28], in which the local authority 
wanted surgery to be performed, the child’s parents were not giving consent and the hospital 
were, at that point, prepared to explore alternatives. 
190  Re O (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) [1993] 2 FLR 149.  
191  Re C (Detention: Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 180.  
192  Re S (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 376. 
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precipitate the removal of a seriously ill child from hospital by his parents without the 
knowledge of his treating doctors.   
 
Although Neon Roberts’ mother continued to object to the administration of conventional 
treatment, it may be that a s.8 Residence Order (now a Child Arrangements Order) with 
directions as to how it was to be put into effect could have secured his return to his father’s 
care.  Where parents are seeking to do their best for the child, Care Orders, associated with 
neglect and harm are best avoided when, consistent with the aims of the Children Act there 
are less intrusive approaches by which parents can be supported to work with professionals 
to protect the welfare of the child.  Circumstances such as developed in the King case, where 
the parents were united in their opposition and had removed him from the medical care he 
required may have developed into a serious situation where continued involvement of the 
court through wardship is appropriate, if only briefly to secure the return of the child to hospital 
for medical treatment.  The wardship court can then make section 8 orders to secure the 
medical treatment the child needs. 
 
In cases where the child’s condition is chronic rather than acute and parental decisions or 
beliefs raise broader welfare concerns it may be appropriate, because of the obligation upon 
authorities to work together and to try to avoid the need for compulsory action, for the local 
authority to be involved.  Where court orders are necessary to secure the co-operation of 
parents, subject to the limitations upon applications by the local authority, they may apply for 
leave but there needs to be a live issue which either the Trust or parents invite the court to 
decide.193 The child may have ongoing medical needs making him or her a child in need, under 
s.17, to whom local authority has a duty to provide support.   Where parents are failing to seek 
medical advice or not co-operating, it may be necessary for the Trust to work with the local 
authority and for public law orders to be employed in order to secure the co-operation of the 
                                                 
193  Local Authority v SB & AB & MB [2010] EWHC 1744, [15]. 
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parents such as in Re JA when the parents missed appointments with professionals who 
wished to test 14 year-old JA to determine whether he was HIV positive. Having tested HIV 
positive, following an order of the court made at the request of the Trust, and in the context of 
the need for outpatients treatment, ongoing monitoring, blood tests and chest x-rays, 
psychotherapy and peer support, the court concluded that the threshold criteria under s.31 
were satisfied and made a Supervision Order for 12 months.194  The principles of the Children 
Act support the use of the least interventionist approach to secure the welfare of the child with 
public authorities working with parents in a partnership of care.  
 
 
D. A Child-Centred Approach to Children Act Orders on issues concerning Children’s 
Healthcare 
The court can make a s.8 order in any family proceedings in which a question arises 
concerning the welfare of the child including proceedings under the court’s inherent 
jurisdiction,195 upon application,196 on the court’s own volition,197 or in a freestanding 
application by an entitled applicant or with leave.198  Both Specific Issue Orders and Prohibited 
Steps Orders provide a ‘practical answer to a practical problem’, they are not concerned with 
the allocation of rights.199 In contrast to the vague ‘no important step’200 limitation imposed by 
wardship, these orders have the advantage of making the limitations on the exercise of 
parental responsibility clear and specific. To ensure orders are effective, the court can include 
directions as to how the order is to be put into effect or impose conditions to be complied with 
by any person with parental responsibility or anyone in whose favour the order is made, specify 
                                                 
194  In the Matter of JA (a minor) [2014] EWHC 1135.   
195  Children Act 1989, s.8(3). 
196  Children Act 1989, s.10(1)(a)  
197  Children Act 1989, s.10(1)(b). 
198  Children Act 1989, s.10(2).  
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the period of time for which the order or any provisions in it is to have effect and make such 
incidental, supplemental or consequential provisions as the court thinks fit.201   
 
In complex cases, such as that of Neon Roberts discussed above, it may be necessary for the 
court to make a range of orders under the Children Act to secure the medical treatment the 
child needs. Upon application by the Trust, Bodey J made a declaration that the treatment 
package proposed was lawful, authorised ancillary treatment, and treatment upon the consent 
of his father alone, in both cases following discussion with his mother as far as reasonable 
and practicable.202 With reference to the ‘”no order” principle’, the welfare of the child as the 
paramount consideration and the welfare checklist, Bodey J also made a Residence Order in 
the father’s favour and a Prohibited Steps Order preventing the mother from removing Neon 
from his father’s care whilst he was undergoing treatment, giving the mother reasonable 
contact.  The proposed order that the mother hand Neon’s passport to his father was dealt 
with by an assurance from his mother that he did not currently have a passport and an 
undertaking not to apply for one without the father’s consent.203  Centred around ensuring that 
Neon was provided with the medical treatment he required, orders thus extended to the 
practical arrangements for Neon’s care, limiting the mother’s exercise of her parental 
responsibility and enabling his father to work in partnership with the healthcare professionals. 
 
For disagreements between parents and healthcare professionals about a child’s medical 
treatment to be referred to court in an application for a Specific Issue or Prohibited Steps Order 
would direct the court to the fact that it is determining an issue of the exercise of parental 
responsibility, focusing attention upon concrete issues arising from the practical reality of 
caring for the child rather than legal status or theoretical rights and duties.204  Discharge of 
                                                 
201  S.11(7).   
202  An NHS Trust v SR [2012] EWHC 3842, [23-28]. 
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204  Lord Mackay, ‘Joseph Jackson Memorial Lecture – Perceptions of the Children Bill and beyond’ 
(1989) 139 NLJ 505. 
 46 
parental responsibilities to the child depends upon the specific needs of the child focusing 
attention on the child and offering the potential for a child-centred resolution.  
 
Court orders have the effect of modifying parental responsibility, placing limits upon its 
exercise in those aspects covered by the order.   For example, in cases where parents are 
unable to agree to the administration of blood due to their religious beliefs and the court 
authorises the administration of blood products, the ‘responsibility for consent’ for that aspect 
of the treatment is replaced by the judicial decision.205  The standard order made by the courts 
in such cases authorises the administration of blood in an imminently life-threatening situation, 
otherwise requiring doctors to consult with the parents and authorising the administration of 
blood products if there is no ‘reasonable alternative’.  Further, the courts appreciate that it is 
not in the best interests of the child for his or her condition to deteriorate until blood can be 
administered in an emergency and that doctors will need to treat the child without repeated 
recourse to the courts. Whilst responsibility for the child’s upbringing, including other aspects 
of his or her medical treatment, remain with his or her parents according to their sincerely held 
beliefs, decisions about the administration of blood are made according to clinical judgement.  
Section 2(8) provides that holders of parental responsibility are prevented from acting in a way 
which is incompatible with the order. So if the court made a Specific Issue Order, upon 
application from a Trust, authorising a surgical procedure in the welfare of the child, parents 
are prevented from removing the child from the hospital to prevent that surgery from going 
ahead, to do so would be incompatible with the order.206 
 
When determining s.8 applications the court must apply the welfare checklist, although the 
court is not confined to considering these factors. The point has been made that there are 
                                                 
205  Re S (A Minor) [1993] 1 FLR 376, 380. 
206  Holman J in Re TM [2013] EWHC 4103, expressed the view that, in an extreme situation a 
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currently limited examples of applications for Specific Issue Orders in the context of decisions 
concerning children’s healthcare, examples which have inevitably been subjected to criticism. 
However, greater use of Specific Issue Orders would build up expertise in the context of 
children’s health where application of the checklist offers the potential to widen welfare 
determinations beyond the current focus upon medical best interests. The aim of the welfare 
checklist is to focus attention upon the needs of the child.207 Application of the checklist thus 
has the potential to ensure a child-centred approach, even more so were the courts to also 
undertake a detailed examination of the rights of the child under the ECHR in this context.   
The court is required to consider, for example, the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the 
child in light of his or her age and understanding in order to reflect the ‘increasing recognition’ 
of the ‘child’s status as a human being in his own right.’ 208  Supporting children to develop 
independence and decision-making skills whilst protecting them from disproportionate or 
irreversible harm is, as Lord Donaldson put it in Re W, ‘wholly consistent with the philosophy 
of section 1 of the Children Act 1989’.209   This must surely require the court to consider how 
the wishes and feelings of the child could be heard in an age appropriate way, from meeting 
with the child, receiving written statements, a letter or visiting the child and in the case of very 
young children seeking views about the child’s characteristics and experiences not only from 
parents but also the nursing staff and other healthcare professionals involved in their day to 
day care. 
 
Determining the welfare of the child in relation to their medical treatment with consideration of 
their current and future physical and emotional needs, their age, sex, background and relevant 
characteristics, and any harm the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering likewise directs 
the attention of the court to the individual child.210 Importantly, in approaching questions of 
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harm the court must be informed by the child’s perspective on the nature of the harm they 
have experienced or are at risk of experiencing supplemented by, or in the case of younger 
children informed by, accounts from those who know the child best. The experiences of other 
children of the medical condition, its treatment and side-effects could inform the questions to 
be asked in order to gain understanding of the nature of the harm. .  
 
Following Re T and Re C, the court will also consider the views of the child’s parents and the 
effect of these views upon the treatment and care provided, including the effect upon their 
ability to care for the child of any emotional distress if their wishes are overridden.211 This 
reflects the reality of medical treatment being one moment in a past, present and future 
relationship of care.  The attempts by the Court of Appeal in Re T 212 to recognise the 
importance of parental care to a very young child before, during, and after, a liver transplant 
were rightly recognised by Marie Fox and Jean McHale as a welcome development which was 
not fully worked through in that case.213  Addressing the reservations of parents who disagree 
with the treatment proposed by their child’s doctors must be an important function of any 
resolution to secure their commitment to the treatment, confidence in, and co-operation with, 
professionals, and to addressing any emotional harm to the child from overriding their 
sincerely held views about what is best for their child.   
 
Section 1(5) requires the court to be satisfied that making the order would better serve the 
welfare of the child than making no order.214 Andrew Bainham has described this as a 
provision of ‘common sense’; there is no point in the court making an order unless to do so 
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would enhance the welfare of the child.215 However, it also reflects the principle that court 
orders are not necessarily the best way of securing the welfare of the child and that the court 
does not necessarily know better than the child’s parents so should only intervene where it is 
satisfied that it is necessary to do so.  It underscores the focus upon the welfare of the child 
and not the dispute between the parents and professionals. And whilst, by the time the matter 
has been referred to court it may seem that the question about a child’s medical treatment 
needs to be determined as a matter of urgency, it should also be practice for the court to 
require the Trust to detail the steps which have been taken to attempt to resolve the issue 
prior to application to court.  Greater use of s.8 orders in the consideration of the specific issue 
of a child’s medical treatment, not confined to the factors listed in the welfare checklist, has 
the potential to direct the judiciary to the wider welfare context of the individual child, the 
exercise of parental responsibilities and caring relationships in the provision of care to children. 
It offers the potential for court determination of disagreements over a child’s medical treatment 
through a particularistic and relational analysis considering the immediate and the long term 
welfare of the child judged by the ordinary standards of the day.216  Parental responsibility 
must be limited where necessary in the interests of child welfare but being faithful to the 
principles of the Children Act would lead the courts to adopt a child-centred approach to 
welfare focused upon the needs of the individual child.  
 
 
IV THE CHILDREN ACT: A FRAMEWORK FOR WORKING TOGETHER TO CARE  
From its inception the Children Act, its philosophy and its concepts have been subjected to 
critique.217  It has been argued that commitment to the welfare principle has meant a 
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reluctance to engage with, or resistance to, children’s Convention rights.218 Michael Freeman 
has argued for its replacement with a Children’s Act which assimilates the UNCRC.219  None 
of this literature has engaged with its application to children’s healthcare law and some of the 
criticisms may be equally valid in that context. It is also necessary to recognise that with very 
few cases having been brought under the Children Act the application of its provisions remains 
underdeveloped in that context.   
 
The current law emphasises the right of parents to make decisions about their child’s medical 
treatment requiring professionals who are unable to accept their decisions to refer the 
disagreement to court.  This article has argued that determination of disputes about children’s 
healthcare in the exercise of the courts’ inherent jurisdiction has resulted in judicial 
adjudication between the competing claims of parents and professionals to know what is best 
for the child which can distract attention from the child to the dispute itself.220  Decisions can 
seem distanced from the child whose welfare and future is at issue and may leave parents 
unpersuaded.  The principles and concepts of the Children Act provide a guide to parents in 
fulfilment of their responsibilities to their children, working in partnership with healthcare 
professionals in the provision of healthcare and placing duties upon public authorities to work 
together in the welfare of children and upon the courts in the resolution of disagreements 
which arise, putting the child at the centre of relationships of care. The ‘importance and the 
utility’221 of these concepts and principles have not yet been fully realised in the context of 
children’s healthcare.  
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